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by Walter H. Diamond

A MERICAN BUSINESSMEN are frequently startled by the

Take the case of France since de Gaulle came to power.
While approximately 350 American businesses were setting up French distributing centers for the European
Common Market, another 1,000 U.S. firms were negotiating license pacts for patents, trademarks, copyrights,
designs, technical services, certain types of rentals and
trade secrets and formulae. In Australia the 850 so-called
American investors actually consist of only 250 companies laying out funds for capital investments but with 600
firms operating through licensees.

arrangements often gain precedence over direct investments. Nevertheless, by far the majority of companies are
quick to admit that the much lower royalty tax on
patents, trademarks and other services over corporate
rates is the prime incentive for their decision.
Generally speaking, the easiest way for an American
company to find the country which will levy the lowest
royalty tax on its foreign property rights is to follow the
line of least resistance — the Income T a x Convention.
This is why the six nations of the European Economic
Community offer the most receptive conditions for licensing of U.S. property rights of any other area in the
world. For instance, under the double taxation treaty
between the United States and the Netherlands, the
normal Dutch tax of 15 per cent on royalties does not
apply on United States residents, corporations or other
legal entities providing that the recipients do not carry
on business in the Netherlands through a permanent
establishment.

Of course there are numerous reasons why license

T h e same basic exemption on royalties from patents,

impressive number of large and small companies, amounting to some 2,500, that have made direct investments
abroad since 1960. During the past five years more than
2,000 United States firms have established businesses in
Europe alone. Although little publicity is focused on the
vast quantity of license agreements arranged with foreign
companies, surveys show that they outnumber new
overseas investments by nearly three to one.
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copyrights and trademarks is taken into consideration
deration
with the other Common Market members, with
vdth the
exception of Luxembourg. Belgium and France
ice also
exempt the 15 per cent withholding tax when
hen the
American licensor is not doing business on a "permanent
rmanent
establishment" basis. In Western Germany the majority
majority
of royalties are taxed as business income at the: normal
corporate rates of 51 per cent on undistributed profits
ofits and
15 per cent on distributed profits, plus the municipal
lunicipal
trade and turnover taxes, with the rates on individual
dividual
licensors ranging from 20 to 53 per cent, in addition
to
dition to
several local taxes. However, the normal rates may
may be
be
reduced to 25 per cent in the case of the licensor,, or
33/3
or 33/3
per cent in case the licensee bears the tax. On the
other
he other
hand, by using the far-reaching Income Tax Convention
avention
facility, all these Federal taxes on the West German
German
earnings are circumvented through licensing arrangearrangements.
A somewhat different situation exists in Italy. T
h e corThe
porate tax rate of 34.68 per cent, including the; various
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Communal and Provincial taxes added to the basic 24
per cent corporate rate, is applied on two-thirds of the
gross amount accruing to the beneficiary, or a royalty of
approximately 23 per cent when a Tax Convention does
not exist. For individuals engaged in industry or cornmerce, the two-thirds reduction comes to 18.55 per cent
and for those in professional activities the royalty tax is
cut to 10.72 per cent. Professional firms are taxed 8.12
per cent after reductions.
Under the double taxation treaty with the United
States, royalties and other amounts received for copyrights, patents, trademarks, etc. by residents or corporations not having a permanent establishment in Italy can
not exceed 15 per cent. However, the two-thirds reduction figure actually is calculated on the local surtaxes, so
the rates are 4.725 per cent for a corporation, firm or
individual engaged in industry or commerce.
In the case of Luxembourg, the tax on royalties is 12
per cent and is held at the source. The proposed Income
Tax Convention with the United States, signed in 1962
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but not yet ratified by the Senate, will eliminate the tax
on industrial property rights. Incidentally, the Luxembourg double taxation treaty is only one of six treaties,
five of which were signed in 1959 and 1960, which the
Senate seems to think are unimportant enough to shelve
ratification indefinitely.
As an "associate member" of the European Common
Market, Greece enjoys many of the privileges of the six
full partners and, therefore, the 180 million consumer
market of the European Economic Community should
not be overlooked if a profitable Greek license agreement
is available. Greece also has an Income Tax Convention
with the United States and as such, does not tax income
from U.S. licenses for patents, copyrights, trademarks,
secret processes, etc., when a "permanent establishment"
is not involved. If there is a permanent entity, then the
40/4 per cent corporate tax rate and the 3 to 60 per cent
rate on individuals and partnerships apply. Spain, which
has applied for associate membership in the Common
Market, has no tax treaty with the United States and
levies a new 14 per cent tax on royalties.
From the tax viewpoint, therefore, it is obvious that
the Netherlands, Belgium or France are the choice spots
to operate in the European Common Market on a
licensee operation. Moreover, the 15 per cent maximum
tax in these three countries on industrial property rights
certainly is much lower than those on earnings from
capital investment, which average approximately 50 per
cent. At the same time, since the bulk of license accords
are completed without "permanent establishments", it is
safe to say that only one out of fifty American companies
pays royalty taxes to the Federal Governments in these
three Common Market distributing centers.
Among the European Free Trade Association countries, Switzerland usually is regarded as the most attractive location in the "Outer Seven" for royalty payments
on industrial rights. However, the U.S. tax treaties also
eliminate the royalty tax when a "permanent establishment" does not exist for Americans with licensee arrangements in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the
United Kingdom, as well as in Switzerland. T h e convention with Switzerland eliminates the 27 per cent Anticipatory Tax, but the Swiss still withhold the 3 per cent
Coupon Tax. Sweden eliminates the 30 per cent Coupon
Tax altogether, while Norway omits the 25 per cent
tax on non-residents, and Denmark exempts the 22 per
cent to 44 per cent corporate rates and the extremely
high personal taxes reaching 110 per cent. T h e Convention with the United Kingdom eliminates the 53^4 per
cent standard corporate tax and the personal taxes
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reaching 88% per cent.
Austria grants reciprocal exemption "in an amount
not exceeding fair and reasonable consideration" which
not always is complete avoidance and could subject the
licensor to the 15 per cent Capital Returns Tax. Portugal, the remaining member of the "Outer Seven", does
not have an Income Tax Convention with the United
States. Chances are it will be several more years before
the proposed treaty is signed as the Portuguese appear to
be uninterested in completing negotiations. Meanwhile,
royalty payments either carry the 15 per cent industrial
tax from trade and business or the 5 per cent basic corporate rate, plus the 3 to 45 per cent complementary tax.
Although Switzerland has the reputation as the logical
choice for property rights arrangements in the European
Free Trade Association, actually, there are ten times as
many U.S. companies using Great Britain as their base
for manufacturing operations through license. O n the
other hand, a familiar pattern employed by many prominent U.S. and Canadian companies is to establish a Swiss
trading company which owns the patent or license and
sells its rights to the U.S. company. By employing three
Income Tax Conventions, the U.S. royalty payments
may be held abroad freely without being subject to U.S.
taxes.
Under the double taxation treaty with Switzerland,
U.S. royalty transfers are not subject to a withholding
tax when transferred to the Swiss Company which in
turn is 100 per cent owned by a Dutch company in the
Netherlands. The royalties now held by the Swiss company would be subject to the 3 per cent Anticipatory
Tax when remitted to the Dutch company under the
Income T a x Convention between Switzerland and the
Netherlands. The funds could be held in Holland taxlree, and if transferred back to Canada or the United
States, the Netherlands does not tax the balances now
treated as dividends under the Income Tax Convention
with each country. Furthermore, Canada does not tax
this dividend to the Canadian parent, but the income
received by the U.S. parent company, of course, would
be included in the total income subject to the corporate
tax of 50 per cent.
Another popular technique that frequently best serves
American companies having one or more licensed operators in Europe is use of a combination Swiss tradingholding company which is 50 per cent owned by the U.S.
parent and 50 per cent by the licensees. This is generally
practiced when there are at least four licensees so that
each may hold a proportionate small share of stock, but
with their total participation no larger than the 50 per
THE
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cent requirement to justify non-Subpart F income of the
parent licensor.
Any one of the four licensees may use the license of
the other three, or buy products manufactured by the
remaining licensees, and the funds paid to the Swiss
company would be non-taxable by the U.S. Royalties
and sales commissions are retained by the Swiss company. Arrangements generally are made by the parent
with each licensee so that its interest in the Swiss company is offset by increased royalties. Sometimes, the U.S.
parent prefers to give only 48 per cent or 49 per cent of
the voting stock to the licensees and 2 per cent or 1 per
cent respectively to a Swiss bank. However, any prearrangement of switch share voting must be avoided to
justify U.S. Treasury requirements of a non-U.S. foreign
controlled corporation.
When the Latin American Free Trade Association was
created by the Treaty of Montevideo in February, 1960,
nearly every one of the nine members had visions of
some day becoming the principal distributing center for
this Common Market. At that time, each pledged to do
its utmost to ban its complicated tax system and strive
toward an eventual harmonization of taxes on income
and industrial rights. Their pledges were later reiterated
with the signing of the Alliance for Progress.
Despite the shortcomings of the Alliance for Progress,
one of the few areas where worthwhile achievements
must be recognized is the elimination of the maze of
taxes long hindering the development of several Latin
American Republics. Nevertheless, only Argentina and
Ecuador of the nine LAFTA members today can boast
of a single tax on royalties. T h e other seven still apply a
series of basic taxes, surtaxes and supplementary levies
on earnings from industrial rights.
In the complete absence of double taxation treaties
between the United States and the LAFTA participants,
although Conventions with Mexico and Chile are about
ready to be signed with the U.S., tax considerations play
a less important part in choosing a Latin American company to share a license than in chosing a European country. Argentina imposes a flat tax of 38.36 per cent on
royalties, and Ecuador levies the 35 or 36 per cent remittance tax. However, the broad tax concessions offered the
foreign licensor by the Industrial Encouragement Law
places Ecuador probably in the choice location for distributing licensed products within LAFTA. Not only does
Brazil impose a 28 per cent basic tax, a 5 per cent additional tax and a 15 per cent compulsory loan on royalty
transfers, but remittance restrictions now make license
arrangements prohibitive.
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Chile levies the 33 per cent basic tax, plus complementary taxes totaling nearly another 10 per cent. Colombia
and Peru tax royalties at the same high normal rates on
business profits which average between 40 and 50 per cent
while Paraguay requires the corporate rate of 25 per cent
on earnings from industrial rights.
The socially progressive Republic of Uruguay has devised a rather ingenious way to collect on royalty payments. Although the 10 per cent basic rate, plus the
5 to 50 per cent complementary tax, constitute the
normal taxes on royalties, non-resident licensors receive
special dispensation. They are entitled to reductions up
to 50 per cent if the licensor satisfies tax authorities that
he incurred expenses in Uruguay. If the licensor had no
expenses in Uruguay, the withholding tax is 20 per cent
on 95 per cent of the royalty, or slightly more than 18
per cent on the total remittance. Notwithstanding economic, labor and exchange crises, Uruguay thus becomes
the most advantageous LAFTA country to license taxwise.
But like Uruguay, where nationalization policies
threaten U.S. business, Mexico too, is more attractive
for licensing and technical servicing arrangements than
direct investments. In the past eighteen months there
have been two technical agreements for every capital
investment made by an American firm in Mexico. Although the new Mexican Profit Sharing Law, in which
workers receive a share of annual company profits, is
not quite as burdensome as expected, it undoubtedly is
a deterrent to U.S. capital outlays and will continue to
intensify as a menace. Meanwhile, royalties earned from
licensing are taxed from 20 to 55 per cent, while nonresident foreigners receiving income from technical assistance are subject to a 10 per cent withholding tax on
the gross amount. In addition, both types of arrangements are subjected to another 3 per cent on gross royalties paid by Mexican entities to companies residing
abroad.
The Central American Common Market consisting of
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and
Nicaragua does have a member with a treaty avoiding
double taxation with the United States. An Income Tax
Convention signed with Honduras in 1956 — and almost
terminated recently, but continued after the sudden
about-face of the Hondurans — exempts the regular individual and corporate taxes on royalties and other
amounts received from use of copyrights, patents, trademarks and similar industrial property.
From the tax standpoint, as a result of the treaty,
Honduras is the number one site for distribution of your
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product through licensing in the Central American Program of Economic Integration, better known as the
Central American Common Market. But Costa Rica
not only offers the best market, but also has the broadest
tax and investment concessions as well as an excellent
supply of skilled and unskilled labor. Many U.S. companies believe that these inducements overshadow the
absence of an Income Tax Convention and prefer to be
subjected to the 30 per cent business tax on royalty
earnings, thus choosing Costa Rica over Honduras as a
distributing center.
In addition to the Honduran and Canadian tax
treaties, the United States has one more in the Western
Hemisphere that is destined to come into more prominence in the near future. American companies will find
particularly beneficial the pending protocol with the
Netherlands Antilles of the Income T a x Convention
with the Netherlands extended to cover the Antilles in
1955. Under Article I of the Protocol, royalty income
derived from sources within the United States is completely exempt from the 30 per cent withholding tax if
the payer of such income is a U.S. corporation which
has 25 per cent or more of its stock owned by the Netherlands Antilles corporation. As in the case of the previously mentioned Swiss trading-holding company, the
Netherlands Antilles company first would have to own
the license by arrangement with a United States or
foreign company.
Use of a foreign or personal holding company not only
in the Netherlands Antilles, but also in Panama, and
particularly the Bahamas, frequently plays an integral
part of industrial rights arrangements. U n d e r Section
954 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1962, rents or royalties
derived in the active conduct of a trade or business,
which are received from an unrelated person, or one
who owns no more than 50 per cent of the combined
voting power of all stock, are not taxable as imaginary
income, or on a current basis. This is especially beneficial
when the U.S. parent does not wish to bring the royalty
income home but to build it up tax-free or re-invest it
tax-free in a so-called "less-developed" country. Instead
of paying the 50 per cent corporate tax when remitted
by the foreign holding corporation in the Bahamas, the
parent only is -subjected to the 30 per cent withholding
tax on royalties paid to the subsidiary.
While the procedure is acceptable if the U.S. company
is widely held, one must avoid it if the parent is a closely
held corporation. Should it be closely held by five or less
individuals owning 50 per cent or more, then the Bahamanian corporation is a personal holding company
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and subject to the 70 per cent flat personal holding
income tax rate effective under Section 341 of the Revenue Act of 1964.
T h e African Common Market, better known as the
Casablanca Powers, comprising Ghana, Guinea, Mali
and Morocco, started out in a hurry in 1962 to abolish
tariffs, exchange technical assistance and revamp their
extremely low corporate tax rates which generally are
imposed on royalty income from patents, copyrights,
trade secrets and like property. Historically, the Africans
prefer to cover their expenditures by collecting sizeable
and all-inclusive duties on most commodities—a carryover from slave traffic days. Unfortunately, little economic progress has been made to date in any of the
above areas. With no Income T a x Conventions, U.S.
companies are subject to the normal corporate rates of
roughly 30 per cent or 40 per cent, of course excluding
all oil royalties which must be considered separately.
Shortly after the creation of the African Common
Market, Nasser had designs of making Egypt the leader
of this regional trading area. H e immediately put to work
three committees in Cairo to complete details for an
enlarged common market. Stymied by the Casablanca
Powers from the outset, Colonel Nasser is forced to
depend on the Arab League for his regional trading
market. Unlike the Central American Common Market,
there is not a single country among the Casablanca
Powers or the Arab League that is especially conducive
for licensing arrangements because of tax reductions
resulting from treaties. In practically all of the nations
the business taxes ranging from 30 to 50 per cent apply.
However, in Iran certain approved industries may receive 50 per cent tax exemption. Moreover, rental income is subject to a flat 9 per cent. Although several
United States Income Tax Conventions have been proposed with Middle Eastern countries, only one with Israel
has been signed, but not yet ratified by the U.S. Senate.
When this does become effective, the 25 per cent rate
on royalties will be reduced to 15 per cent.
In the Far East, the three-nation common market,
which exists in the form of a customs union between/
the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia, offers no tax
treaty advantages. On the other hand, most of the
Far Eastern nations grant special tax concessions on
technical assistance arrangements in important industrial
development. The Philippines did not renew the law
expiring in 1958 which fully exempted "new and necessary industries" from the current 30 per cent withholding
tax on royalty income on foreign corporations not doing
business with the Philippines and having no branch or
THE
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office there. Taiwan does reduce the 25 per cent normal
tax to 18 per cent on royalty income for most industries
falling under the Republic of China Statute for Encouragement of Investment.
Three important Income Tax Conventions of the U.S.
do exist with key Far Eastern nations whose total number
of licensees of American property come close to 1,000.
Another, with India, was signed in 1959 but not yet
ratified. However, of these four treaties, only the one
with Pakistan exempts the tax on royalties for the use of
patents, copyrights, designs, secret processes or formulae,
trademarks and similar property.

allow no exemptions, as with Canada which has a 15
per cent rate on royalties, and in the case of the Indian
treaty whereby a 50 per cent income tax and supertax
are levied, and the remaining third provide either for
complete exemption or a reduction. For instance, in the
case of the Japanese treaty, the maximum tax on all
royalties other than on natural resources is reduced to
15 per cent. In specified cases the rate on Japanese
royalties is still further cut to 10 per cent—a substantially
lower rate than the 38 per cent corporate rate on direct
investments. However, the 12 per cent local Enterprise
T a x applies both on royalties and business profits.

The taxation of royalties on the majority of industrial
property in varying amounts under the remaining three
Far Eastern treaties—Australia, New Zealand and India
—emphasize that advantages are not always synonymous
with Tax Conventions. In fact, sometimes there are
disadvantages. Australia's treaty is a typical example of
the pitfalls that exist in assuming you are protected from
excessive taxation without analyzing each Convention as
a separate document. The Australian agreement only
exempts royalties for the use of producing a literary,
dramatic, musical or artistic work in which copyrights
subsist. Royalties from rental property or exploitation of
mines or natural resources may elect to be subject to the
tax of the other party on a net basis as if that resident
were engaged in trade or business through a permanent
establishment. Thus, on royalty income from Australia,
United States residents pay the normal 40 per cent tax.
A U.S. subsidiary would pay the 40 per cent corporate
tax rate and withhold another 40 per cent on the remittance to the American licensor. As in many Conventions,
such as is the case of the Canadian treaty, there is no
reference to royalties from patents, trade secrets, trade
marks and similar industrial property.

This underlines another fallacy regarding royalty exemptions on licenses and technical services when Income
Tax Conventions are in effect. Since the treaties cover
Federal taxes only, many U.S. firms overlook the existence of municipal, provincial, cantonal or other local
taxes. Sometimes the tax burden on patents and technical service agreements may turn out to be much heavier
than expected despite the elimination of taxes through
Conventions. Moreover, many countries apply their turnover taxes on top of the local taxes. For instance, in Italy
one may believe there is complete exemption but the local
and turnover taxes come to 8.625 per cent. Belgium levies
its 6 per cent turnover tax on royalties and West Germany
imposes its 4 per cent turnover and 1 per cent net worth
tax.

Although the Convention with New Zealand taxes the
same rights and contains the same minimum exclusions
as are covered in the Australian treaty, it also exempts
rentals from motion picture films. Royalties from mines,
natural resources, copyrights, patents, trademarks, etc.
are subject to the ordinary income tax rates of 42 J/2 per
cent on business income. O n the other hand, rentals from
motion picture films are exempted in New Zealand but
there is no exemption on this income in the Australian
Convention.
In fact, a study of the 26 U.S. Income Tax Conventions now in effect and those signed but not ratified
reveals that for about one-third the tax on motion pictures can not exceed 50 per cent of the statutory rate
imposed on such rentals. One third of these Conventions
JUNE,
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Changes in tax systems or the discovery of abuses in
existing treaties frequently require revisions. Right now
the Conventions with the Netherlands, West Germany
and Canada are under review. These modifications can
distort an entire tax picture on license agreements.
Therefore, over-dependence in linking royalty arrangements to tax treaties creates a hazard that sometimes
becomes disastrous. As an example, the proposed increase
in the Netherlands dividend tax may at some time later
spread to royalty income.
Today, many countries take a firm tax position in
respect to patent royalties versus service fees. Under
special instructions issued by the Indian Government in
New Delhi, royalty payments to foreign collaborators are
singled out as having distinction from fees for services
rendered abroad by a foreign collaborator. T h e element
of royalty as such as in the use of patents is fully taxable
but the element of fees for services is exempt from tax
in India.
India's tax
agreement is
outside India
the patent is

position is such that even if the licensing
entered into and the royalties are payable
the royalty income arises in India because
used within the country. In the renowned
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Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (India) Ltd. case, the Bombay
High Court upheld that licensing in India constitutes a
business connection and as such is subject to normal
business taxes.
Brazil's new remittance law takes the position that
royalty payments due for patents of inventions, industrial
and commercial trademarks or similar payments depend
on submission of proof by the interested party that the
respective privileges have not expired in the country of
origin. As is generally known, remittances for payment
of royalties for use of patents, trademarks and similar
rights are not permitted between a branch or subsidiary
of a company established in Brazil and its Head Office
abroad, or when the majority of the company's capital
in Brazil belongs to the recipients of the royalties abroad.
Of course, this stand stems from the acute exchange
crisis in Brazil. Instead of raising royalty taxes still further, it prefers to keep the royalties in Brazil altogether.
Certain fees for services by U.S. companies are not
block by the profit remittance law in Brazil. Furthermore, there are many other devious yet legal methods
such as finders' fees, Brazilian stock purchases and cruzeiro loans to effect transfers.
Another royalty tax problem frequently encountered
evolves from computation. In some cases, taxable income from royalties is computed according to the net
worth comparison method. It is the custom in other
nations to figure taxable income as the excess of gross
income over income-connected expenses. Usually the
method of calculation depends upon the category of
taxable income under which it is classified. The two
systems vary widely.
West Germany, where both methods are practiced, is
a clear-cut example of the differences. Here certain
valuation rules apply and a write-down of the intangible
property to lower value is permitted under specific conditions. Moreover, the expenditures incurred in the invention may be capitalized and thus secure a cost basis
in case of sale of the patent later. If the expenditures
result in an operating loss, the latter may be carried
forward to the following five taxable years.
Under the second method, registration fees for the
patent, copyright or process, as well as research and
development expenses, are deductible as inter-connected
expenses. If expenditures incurred before income from
the patent result in a loss after the deduction, then the
loss may be offset against other income in the same
taxable year.
An unforeseen problem on patent, copyright and
trademarks that many Americans do not count upon is

38

the annual renewal of taxes on most licenses. Renewal
taxes on patents, frequently called annuities in some
nations, can be expensive in each country and when
several are involved can mount into thousands of dollars
of taxes annually.
With the creation of various common markets around
the globe, there probably is no question today more
thoroughly debated yet so remotely resolved than tax
harmonization. The six members of the European Economic Community have pledged to harmonize turnover
taxes this year. Although Article 99 of the Treaty of
Rome calls for a broad reform and unification of all
taxes, little headway has been made in discussion on
most taxes, including levies on royalties. Target date for
a single royalty tax on property rights is 1970.
Actually, the nine members of the Latin American
Common Market have made more progress toward
reforms and unfication than the "Inner Six" participants
of Europe. Five Latin countries already have approved
new taxes by simplifying their systems, with emphasis on
income taxes but affecting royalties. Two members of the
"Outer Seven" also have lowered taxes on industrial
property since the European Free Trade Association was
created. In view of the past history of the creeping
progress towards tax harmony among all countries of the
world when not under Income Tax Convention coercion,
it is most doubtful that any of the nine regional trading
areas will ever reach any degree of unity on royalty
taxes. Integration of property rights taxes is bound to be
a long drawn-out problem and the wide disparities of
today are likely to be with us in the nineteen-seventies.
Because of the wide divergencies in tax rates ranging
from complete exemption to as much as 80 per cent, and
in view of frequent political confrontation, there is a
greater need than ever for guarantees and concessions
of industrial rights by respective governments. Although
exactly 68 nations have passed investment encouragement laws in the post-war era to attract U.S. investment,
only a handful cover royalties from patent licenses, trademarks, copyrights and similar property. In their desire
to lure private American capital, many foreign nations
concentrate on "tax holidays" for direct investment in
industry, but neglect local manufacturing through
licensing.
As is well known, guarantees to protect rights are
almost totally lacking in many areas of the world. Although several movements belatedly have sprung up
urging less-developed nations to stop recent nationalization threats, such as witnessed in Argentina, Brazil,
Uruguay, Peru, Boliva, Ceylon, Indonesia and even
THE
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Zanzibar little progress is expected in halting seizures.
U.S. companies would be wise to investigate the use of
protection under Investments Guarantees Division of the
Agency of International Development. While guarantees
for licensing patents, trademarks and technical services
have been available since 1948 under the original Foreign
Assistance Act, they are seldom used. On the other hand,
$1.5 billion worth of similar guarantees have been issued
for direct investment. There is no doubt that for the
small charge of *4 per cent each for guarantees covering
expropriation, war or inconvertibility of currency, it is
a worthwhile investment on your part to be assured that
you will actually receive your income after the foreign
tax deductions from property held abroad.
While taxes levied by foreign countries on profits from
patents, trademarks, copyrights and licenses are your
chief consideration, of course there are numerous steps
that American business also must weigh in minimizing
the U.S. tax burden on overseas income from property
and services. In addition to the foreign tax credit taken
against United States taxes paid, it is frequently helpful
to decontrol a patent-holding company by exchanging
stock for equity in the licenses. By allowing native interests in a foreign investment company to own patents
locally, royalty income from licenses will not be taxed
currently in the United States.
Sometimes it is advisable to integrate foreign manufacturing with leasing operations. This permits rental
income by both producer or leasing subsidiary to be
classified as non-foreign personal holding company. Moreover there are several frequently practiced techniques
that may reduce or eliminate the accrual of Foreign
Base Company services income to a Controlled Foreign
Corporation from use of technical, managerial or commercial services outside its country of incorporation for
or on behalf of related persons. Among these are:
(1) integrating manufacturing and services
companies;
(2) routing service income through a manufacturing
subsidiary in a low tax country;
(3) meeting the provisions of the 20 - 80 per cent test
under which no part of services income is Foreign
Base Company services income if less than 20
per cent of all services are performed outside the
country of incorporation; and finally,
(4) realizing Foreign Base Company services income
through the escape hatch provisions of minimum
distribution.
JUNE,
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In order to facilitate the use of this information as a
handy reference, we have listed the tax rates levied on
royalties by the respective countries comprising the
several Common Markets as well as three other general
areas. We also have indicated the most favorable sites
for license arrangements in each of these regional trading

I. European Economic Community (Inner Six)
Federal Tax on Royalty Payments to United States
Country

No permanent
establishment

With permanent
establishment

1. Netherlands*

None

15%

2. Beligum*

None

15%

3. France*

None

15%

4. West Germany

None

5 1 % undistributed plus
15% distributed
(Corporate)
20 to 5 3 % (Individual)

5. Italy

4.725%

23% (Corporate)
18.55% (Individual)

6. Luxembourg

12%

12%

Greece (Associate
member)

None

40/4% (Corporate)
3 to 60% (Individual)

Spain (Applicant
for membership)

14%

14%

II. European Free Trade Association (Outer Seven)
Federal Tax on Royalty Payments to United States
No permanent
establishment

With permanent
establishment

1. Switzerland*

3%

30%

2. Sweden

None

30%

3. Norway

None

25%

4. Denmark

None

22 to 44% (Corporate)
U p to 110% (Individual)

5. United Kingdom* None

533/4% (Corporate)
U p to 883/4% (Individual)

Country

6. Austria

None

7. Portugal

15%

15%
15% (from trade or
business)
5% plus 3 to 4 5 %
(Corporate)
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Latin American

III.

Free Trade

Association**

With or without permanent

V I I . Arab

establishment

League**

With or without permanent

establishment

1. Argentina

38.36%

I.Egypt

2. Ecuador*

35 or 36%

2. Lebanon

3. Brazil

28% plus 5% plus 15%

3. I r a n *

12 to 50% (Reduced by 50%)

33% plus 10%

4. Iraq

10 to 40% (non-resident individual)
10 to 30% (Corporate)

4. Chile

22.2%
5 to 42%

l

/i to 5 1 % plus 20 to 56% excess profits
tax (Individual)
12 to 36% plus 20 to 56% excess profits
tax (Corporate)

5. Colombia

6. Peru

5. Syria

6 to 36%

6. Saudi Arabia

20%

5 to 35% plus 15% complementary tax

7. Paraguay

V I I I . Other Middle

25%

8. Uruguay*

10% plus 5 to 50% reduced to 19%

9. Mexico

20 to 55% and 10% on technical
assistance

East**

With or without permanent

25%

1. Israel*
IX. Far East Common

Market**

With or without permanent

IV. Central America

Common

Market

With or without permanent

1. Thailand

establishment

1. Costa Rica*

30%

2. El Salvador

20%

3. Guatemala

5 to 4 8 %

4. Honduras*

None — (30% if permanent establishment for individual or corporation)

5. Nicaragua

4 to 30%

2. Philippines*
3. Malaysia

With permanent
establishment

1. Netherlands
Antilles*

3%

3 % plus 30%

2. Panama

2 to 35%

2 to 35%

3. Bahamas

30%

30%

4. Canada*

15%

15%

2. India

Market**

With or without permanent

40% (average for 4 member nations)

establishment

6 to 25% (reduced to 18% for certain
industries)
50%
None (If permanent establishment then
2 to 75% for individual and 50 or
60% for corporate)

4. Australia

40% (Individual)
40% (each by subsidiary and parent for
corporation)

6. J a p a n *

42/a%
15% (38% if permanent establishment)

establishment

1. Ghana

2 / 2 to 30% (Individual)
40% (Corporate)

2. Guinea

30% (may be reduced by agreement)

3. Mali

30 to 40%

4. Morocco*

3.65 plus 1/4%

40

30%

3. Pakistan*

5. New Zealand
V I . Africa Common

10 to 50% (Individual)
15 to 25% plus 1/2% of gross receipts
(Corporate)

With or without permanent

Hemisphere

No permanent
establishment

establishment

X. Other Far East

1. Taiwan
V. Other Western

establishment

* Most favored site for license arrangement within respective Common Market or area.
** No Income Tax Convention presently in effect with
U.S. within respective Common Market or area so
that rate is same whether with or without permanent
establishment.
THE
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